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Cet article traite des modifications de 1985 la Loi sur les indiens et comment
ces modifications continuent d'6tre discriminatoires envers les Indiennes et
leurs enfants alors qu'elles 6taient cens6es apporter des correctifs.
Avant les modifications de 1985 A la Loi sur les indiens, une indienne perdait
son statut d'indienne si elle 6pousait un homme sans statut d'indien. Au
contraire, un homme ayant le statut d'indien conservait non seulement son statut
d'indien s'il 6pousait une femme sans statut d'indien mais il permettait sa
nouvelle 6pouse d'acqu6rir le statut d'indien malgrd son statut de non indienne.
Les modifications de 1985 devaient corriger cette discrimination. Toutefois, il
demeure de la discrimination sexuelle r6siduelle dans ]a fagon de d6terminer le
statut d'indien. Les hommes qui avaient le statut d'indien et qui dpousaient une
femme non indienne avant 1985 pouvaient transmettre leur statut d'indien
travers deux g6n6rations successives de mariage entre indien et non indien. Les
femmes qui avaient le statut d'indienne et qui 6pousaient un homme non indien
avant 1985 ne pouvaient transmettre leur statut d'indienne qu'a une seule
gfn6ration successive de mariage entre indien et non indien.
L'auteure 6tudie la question de la discrimination sexuelle r6siduelle, les contes-
tations qui ont prfc6d6 la mise en application de la Charte a la Loi sur les indiens,
les conflits entre les droits collectifs et les droits individuels et une analyse de
la Charte en ce qui a trait a cette question.
* Elizabeth Jordan is a third year law student at University of Toronto. She is a Mohawk
from Six Nations.
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INTRODUCTION
Section 6 of the Indian Act1 defines an Indian2 for the purposes of the Act.
Recognition as an Indian confers certain benefits, including the right to live on
a reserve and entitlement to housing, health and education benefits. 3 In addition,
there is the "psychological" benefit of being "officially" recognized as an
Indian. As Indian and Northern Affairs (INAC) has noted, many people look at
their Indian status and band membership as the basis of their identity as Indian
people.
4
I. R.S.C. 1985, c. I-5. Section 6 of the Indian Act is as follows:
6. (1) Subject to section 7, a person is entitled to be registered if
(a) that person was registered or entitled to be registered immediately prior to April 17,
1985;
(b) that person is a member of a body of persons that has been declared by the Gover-
nor in Council on or after April 17, 1985 to be a band for the purposes of this Act;
(c) the name of that person was omitted or deleted from the Indian Register, or from a
band list prior to September 4, 1951, under subparagaph 12(l)(a)(iv), paragraph
12(1)(b) or subsection 12(2) or under subparagraph 12(1)(a)(iii) pursuant to an order
made under subsection 109(2), as each provision read immediately prior to April 17,
1985, or under any former provision of this Act relating to the same subject-matter as
any of those provisions;
(d) the name of that person was omitted or deleted from the Indian Register, or from a
band list prior to September 4, 1951, under subparagraph 12(l)(a)(iii) pursuant to an
order made under subsection 109(1), as each provision read immediately prior to April
17, 1985, or under any provision of this Act relating to the same subject-matter as any
of those provisions;
(e) the name of that person was omitted or deleted from the Indian Register, of from a
band list prior to September 4, 1951,
(i) under section 13, as it read immediately prior to September 4, 1951, or under any
former provision of this Act relating to the same subject-matter as that section, or
(ii) under section 111, as it read immediately prior to July 1, 1920, or under any former
provision of this Act relating to the same subject-matter as that section; or
(f) that person is a person both of whose parents are or, if no longer living, were at the
time of death entitled to be registered under this section.
(2) Subject to section 7, a person is entitled to be registered if that person is a person
one of whose parents is or, if no longer living, was at the time of death entitled to be
registered under subsection (1).
(3) For the purposes of paragraph (1)(f) and subsection (2),
(a) a person who was no longer living immediately prior to April 17, 1985 but who
was at the time of death entitled to be registered under paragraph (1)(a); and
(b) a person described in paragraph (1) (c), (d), or (e) who was no longer living on
April 17, 1985 shall be deemed to be entitled to be registered under that paragraph.
R.S., c. 1-6, s. 6; 1985, c. 27, s. 4.
2. For the purposes of this essay, the term "Indian" is used to refer only to those Aborigi-
nal people of Canada defined as "Indian" under the Indian Act.
3. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, You Wanted To Know: Programs And Services
For Registered Indians (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1993) at 6-11.
4. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Indian Band Membership: An Information Book-
Residual Sex Discrimination in the Indian Act
The Indian Act was amended by Bill C-31 in 1985 in order to comply with
section 15 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms. However, hidden in the earlier
legislation and the amended Indian Act is residual sexual discrimination in
determining Indian status. Indian women who married non-Indian men prior to
the 1985 amendments are not able pass on their status in the same manner as
Indian men who married non-Indian women prior to the enactment of Bill C-3 1.
While those Indian men who married non-Indians prior to 1985 may pass on
their Indian status through two successive generations of status/non-status
intermarriage, all other Indians (including Indian women who married out prior
to 1985) are only able to pass on their Indian status through one successive
generation of intermarriage. Although other types of sexual discrimination exist
under the amended Indian Act, I will focus on discrimination in the marrying
out provisions. I will examine the nature and scope of this residual sexual
discrimination, and suggest that this discrimination violates s. 15 of the Charter.
Finally, I will consider the merits of potential constitutional remedies to this
problem.
"MARRYING OUT"
Prior to the 1985 amendments to the Indian Act (commonly referred to as Bill
C-3 1), an Indian woman, under the former s. 12(1)(b)5 of the Act, lost her status
as an Indian if she married someone lacking Indian status. On the other hand,
an Indian man not only retained his status when "marrying out", but also
conferred his status upon his non-Indian wife under s. 11 (1)(f) of the Act.
European cultural values determined the patrilineal system of Indian status that
was imposed under the Indian Act.6 While clearly discriminatory, one of the
justifications for this sexual discrimination in sections 6 and 12 of the Act was
advanced by the Crown in the A.G. Canada v. Lavell 7 case. The Crown argued
that the rationale behind these provisions was to prevent Indian land from
coming under the control of non-Indian men who married into Indian bands.
However, statements from the Minister responsible for Indian Affairs in 1869
indicate that the intended goal of the marrying out provisions of the Indian Act
let Concerning New Indian Band Membership Laws and the Preparation of Indian Band
Membership Codes (Ottawa: Minister of Supplies and Services, 1985) at 4.
5. R.S.C. 1980, c. 1-6, s. 12(1)(b) of the Indian Act read as follows:
12. (1) The following persons are not entitled to be registered, namely,
(b) a woman who married a person who is not an Indian, unless that woman is subse-
quently the wife or widow of a person described in section 11.
6. Kathleen Jamieson, "Indian Women and the Law in Canada: Citizens Minus" Ottawa:
Minister of Supply and Services, 1978 at 13.
7. [1974] S.C.R. 1349.
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was to promote assimilation of Indians with white society. The effect on Indian
women was incidental to the purpose of the Act. 8
The Indian Act of 1869 was originally designed to apply to Iroquois and
Algonquian Indians. 9 There was considerable evidence, even at that time, that
the provisions for determining "Indianness" conflicted with the traditional
matrilineal and matrilocal culture of the Iroquois. In traditional Iroquois culture,
descent, leadership and clan membership are determined through the female
line.10
PRE-CHARTER CHALLENGES TO SECTION 6 OF THE INDIAN ACT
Protests of Aboriginal people against the "marrying out" provisions of the Act
are recorded as early as 187211 and have continued ever since. Early records of
the Six Nations of the Grand River Band Council indicate that there were a
number of appeals made to the band council on the marrying out provisions of
the Indian Act shortly after the Act came into force in 1869.12
In 1969, several Mohawk women who had lost their status through the former
s. 12(1)(b) of the Indian Act prepared a brief for the Royal Commission on the
Status of Women. Although a recommendation to eliminate the sexual discrim-
ination in the Indian Act was to appear in the final report of the Royal Commis-
sion, it was removed shortly before the report of the Commission was
published.'
3
8. Supra, note 6 at 33-38. Jamieson notes that Langevin, then Minister of Indian Affairs, envi-
sioned reserves would be broken up into lots held in fee simple by enfranchised Indians.
9. Supra, note 6 at 8.
10. Douglas Sanders, "Indian Women: A Brief History of Their Roles and Rights" (1975)
21 McGill L.J. 656 at 656.
11. Supra, note 6 at 30. Jamieson notes that the Grand Council of Ontario and Quebec Indi-
ans requested amendments to s. 6 of the Indian Act to allow Indian women to marry
whom they chose.
12. John A. Noon, Law and Government of the Grand River Iroquois, (New York: Viking
Publishers, 1949). At 131-33 and at 135, Noon cites the cases of several women who
married out. The band council, which at that time was the traditional Iroquois govern-
ment, seems to have had a very wide discretion for granting or denying reinstatement as
an Indian. It is difficult to discern any consistent pattern of reasoning in the decisions
included by Noon in the appendix. However, the band council seemed more amenable
to reinstating women who returned to the Six Nations Reserve to live when their hus-
bands had either abandoned them or were deceased.
13. Mary Two-Axe Earley, Presentation at the 18th Annual Native Women's Association
of Canada General Assembly Banquet, October 17, 1992 at 4-5.
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After the result of the Drybones v. Canada case, 14 many Aboriginal women felt
that an action against the discriminatory marrying out provisions of the Indian
Act would be a strong case. In Drybones, section 94(b) of the Indian Act, which
made it an offence for an Indian to be found intoxicated off a reserve, was
successfully challenged. The majority of the Supreme Court of Canada held that
s. 94(b) violated s. 1 (b) of the Bill of Rights, which guaranteed "equality before
the law", and was thus inoperative to the extent that the statute was inconsistent
with the Bill of Rights.
The Lavel115 case was a challenge to s. 12 (1)(b), the marrying out provision, of
the Indian Act. Janet Corbiere Lavell is an Ojibway woman from the
Wikwemigong band on Manitoulin Island. Lavell lost her status as an Indian
upon her marriage to a white man in December of 1970. Lavell, aware that she
would lose her status, made clear that she intended to challenge in court section
12(1)(b) of the Act. 16
Yvonne Bedard, who would later join Lavell's cause of action at the Supreme
Court of Canada, found herself in a similar position. Bedard, originally from the
Six Nations Reserve in Ohsweken, Ontario, lost her Indian status when she
married in 1964. Upon her separation- from her white husband in 1970, Ms.
Bedard returned to the Six Nations Reserve and lived in the house willed to her
by her mother. The band council allowed Bedard and her two children to live in
the house for approximately one year.17 However, when Ms. Bedard became a
vocal supporter of Joseph Logan, a traditional Iroquois chief who was openly
critical of the band council elected under the Indian Act, the band council sought
to have her evicted from her mother's home. 18
Jean Chretien, then Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs, offered to finan-
cially support the intervention of any band opposed to the action brought by
Lavell and Bedard. When the case reached the Supreme Court of Canada, a
14. [1970] S.C.R. 282.
15. Supra, note 7.
16. Lilianne Ernestine Krosenbrink-Gelissen, Sexual Equality As An Aboriginal Right: The
Native Women's Association of Canada and the Constitutional Process on Aboriginal
Matters, 1982-1987, (Fort Lauderdale: Verlag breitenbach Publishers, 1991) at 79.
17. Ibid. at 80.
18. The tension between the traditional form of Iroquois government and the elected band
council on Six Nations is well-documented. For a detailed, historical analysis of the
problem see D.J. Bourgeois, "Six Nations: A Neglected Aspect of Canadian Legal His-
tory" (1986) 6(2) Can. J. of Native Studies 253. Joseph Logan had earlier brought a suit
against the elected band council which challenged its authority to cede reserve land in
Logan v. Styres (1959), 20 D.L.R. (2d) 416 (Ont. H.C.).
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number of Aboriginal groups intervened to support the Attorney-General. 19
Many of these groups have been criticized by the Native Women's Association
of Canada (NWAC) as being male-dominated and representing a patriarchal
form of government, more akin to European forms of government and contrary
to many traditional Aboriginal forms of government:
The Indian Act has imposed upon us a patriarchal system and patriarchal
laws which favour men. Only men could give Indian status and band mem-
bership. At one time, only men could vote in band elections. By 1971, this
patriarchal system was so ingrained with[in] our communities, that "patriar-
chy" was seen as a "traditional trait"... even the memory of our matriarchal
forms of government, and our matrilineal forms of descent were forgotten
or unacknowledged. Some legal writers argue that it was the federal gov-
ernment alone, and not Aboriginal governments, which discriminated
against women. In fact, the Aboriginal male governments and organizations
were part of the wall of resistance encountered by Aboriginal women in
their struggle to return to their communities.
20
The plaintiffs in Lavell argued that the marrying out provision also violated
section 1(b) of the Bill Of Rights. By a narrow five-four majority, the Supreme
Court of Canada held that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the Indian Act and
thus neatly skirted around the issue of sexual discrimination against Indian
women. Ritchie J., in his majority opinion, held that the Bill of Rights did not:
...render inoperative legislation, such as s. 12(1)(b) of the Indian Act, passed
by the Parliament of Canada in discharge of its constitutional function
under s. 91(24) of the B.N.A. Act, to specify how and by whom Crown lands
reserved for Indians are to be used... 2 1
19. B.J. McCourt, "Case Comment - Civil Rights: Loss of Indian Status By Indian Women
Marrying Non-Indian Under Indian Act (Can.), s. 12(l)(b): Whether Provision Inoper-
ative Under Canadian Bill of Rights as Discrimination By Reason of Sex and Denial of
Equality Before the Law: Re Lavell and Attorney-General of Canada, 38 D.L.R. 3d
481 (Sup. Ct. 1973)" (1974) 6 Ottawa L.R. 635 at 637. McCourt notes that the National
Indian Brotherhood, the Native Council of Canada, the Indian Association of Alberta,
the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs, the Manitoba Indian Brotherhood Inc.,
the Union of New Brunswick Indians, the Indian Brotherhood of the Northwest Territo-
ries, the Union of Nova Scotia Indians, the Union of Ontario Indians, the Federation of
Saskatchewan Indians, the Indian Association of Quebec, the Yukon Native Brother-
hood and the Six Nations of the Grand River Band Council all intervened on behalf of
the Attorney General, to defends. 12(1)(b). With the exception of the Native Council of
Canada, all of these groups represented status Indians. A much smaller number of
groups intervened on behalf of Lavell and Bedard.
20. Native Women's Association of Canada, "Statement on the 'Canada Package' 1992,
Ottawa: NWAC, at 3.
21. Supra, note 7 at 1372.
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Apparently, Ritchie J. seems to have missed the point. Lavell and Bedard were
concerned with more than merely their rights on "Crown lands reserved for
Indians." Lavell and Bedard were concerned with discrimination against them
because they were women, not because they were Indians. Further, as Peter Hogg
points out, for Parliament to "voluntarily withdraw" from a field of power granted
under the BNA Act does not make Parliament powerless to "re-enter" that field.2 2
Hogg suggests the correct view is that adopted by Laskin in his dissent-that
the Bill of Rights abolishes all special laws for Indians which place Indians in
a position which is disadvantageous in comparision with non-Indians. 23
Nowhere in the Lavell decision does Ritchie J. deny that s. 12(1)(b) of the Act
discriminates against Indian women relative to Indian men. What therefore
appears to underlie Ritchie J.'s decision in Lavell is the politically sensitive
nature of the problem. Implicit in Ritchie J.'s decision is the idea that it is better
for the court to sacrifice the rights of Indian women than to interfere with what
was the status quo at the time. It is difficult to reconcile Ritchie J.'s decision in
Lavell with the court's decision in Drybones. It has been suggested that one
major factor in the Drybones decision was the evidence that s. 94(b) of the Act
was widely regarded as discriminatory and was going to be amended or elimi-
nated from the Act.
24
A subsequent appeal to the United Nations Human Rights Committee, on the
same issue, was made by Sandra Lovelace in 1981. Lovelace is a Maliseet Indian
from the Tobique Reserve in New Brunswick. In 1970, Ms. Lovelace lost her
status as an Indian upon her marriage to a non-Indian man. Lovelace returned
to the Tobique reserve when her marriage broke up. Although this was a
violation of the Indian Act, Lovelace argued that she had no other place to live.
While the band council sought to have Lovelace removed from the reserve, there
were a number of band members who supported Lovelace.
Lovelace argued that s.12(1)(b) of the Act was a violation of Canada's obliga-
tions under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the
International Bill of Human Rights. In July, 1981, the U.N. Human Rights
Committee found the Canadian government in breach of article 27 of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights in denying Lovelace Indian
band membership and the right to return to the reserve.25 The Human Rights
22. P.W. Hogg, "Case Note - 'The Canadian Bill of Rights - Equality Before The Law' -
A.G. Can. v. Lavell," (1974) 12 Can. Bar Review 263 at 267.
23. Ibid. at 267.
24. Supra, note 19 at 638.
25. Lovelace v. Canada, 36 U.N. GOAR Supp. (No. 40) Annex XVIII; U.N. Doc. A/36/40
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Committee found that Lovelace was ethnically a Maliseet Indian by virtue of
the fact that she had been "born and brought up on a reserve... [and has] kept
ties with [her] community."
26
The Human Rights Committee's decision did not deal with the sex discrimina-
tion under the Indian Act as the Covenant had not been ratified in Canada until
1976. Sandra Lovelace had lost her status upon her marriage to a non-native
man in 1970, before the ratification of the Covenant. The decision therefore dealt
only with the right of Indian bands to determine their own membership. The
decision of the Human Rights Committee has been widely interpreted as
recognizing a right of Aboriginal communities to determine their membership.27
While awaiting the decision of the Human Rights Committee on the Lovelace
case, Parliament developed the "Options Clause." The clause would allow
Indian bands to request the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs to suspend
sections 12(l)(b) and 12(1)(a)IV (the old double mother rule - whereby a person
born of a marriage entered into after September 4, 1951 whose mother gained
status through marriage and whose father's mother had gained status in the same
way would lose his status upon turning 2128). The "Options Clause" came into
effect the day the Committee issued its decision in the Lovelace case.29
PROPOSALS TO AMEND THE INDIAN ACT
After the Lovelace appeal to the U.N. Human Rights Committee, it became
apparent that the Indian Act would have to be amended in order to comply with
s. 15 of the Charter. The attempts to remedy the sexually discriminatory
provisions of the Indian Act were the subject of widespread and heated debate.
The Aboriginal community itself was divided on the issue of whether or not s.
12(1)(b) of the Act should be eliminated. 30
Those who opposed the elimination of s. 12(1)(b) were against it for a variety
of reasons. Some were concerned about the federal government interfering in
(1981).
26. Ibid. at 12.
27. Wendy Moss, "Indigenous Self-Government in Canada and Sexual Equality Under the
Indian Act: Resolving Conflicts Between Collective and Individual Rights" Fall, 1990
15 Queen's L.J. No.2 279 at 294.
28. Douglas E.Sanders, "The Indian Act and the Bill of Rights" (1974) 6 Ottawa L.R. 397 at
407.
29. Supra, note 16 at 96-97.
30. Ontario Advisory Council on Women's Issues, Native Women And The Law, (Toronto:
Ontario Advisory Council On Women's Issues, 1989) at 17.
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an Aboriginal problem and the effect this would have on Aboriginal self-gov-
ernment.
Many more Aboriginal people were concerned about the economic impact of
having an influx of new statutorily recognized Indians. There were no guaran-
tees that there would be additional resources for those Indians reinstated under
any amendments to the Indian Act. In light of these economic concerns, one
justification supporters of s. 12(1)(b) had was that it helped to provide a "stable"
status Indian population.
According to this view, the marrying out provisions of the Act when looked at
in conjunction with s. 1l(1)(f) of the old Act, which conferred status on
non-Indian women who married Indian men, ensured that the population gaining
status would approximate the population losing status. 31 There was also a very
real concern that more assimilated people granted status through amendments
to the Indian Act would take control in First Nations and that this would lead to
a disintegration of Aboriginal culture.
32
The first proposal to amend the Indian Act, Bill C-47, was introduced in the House
of Commons on June 18, 1984.33 It proposed a quarter blood rule for determining
Indian status - children of status Indians and non-Indians to one quarter Indian blood
would be recognized as status Indians. It also proposed that no individual would
gain or lose status by marriage; that status and band membership would not be
determined by sex; and that no individual would lose status due to any amendments
made to the Act.
34
Both NWAC and the Assembly of First Nations (AFN) were critical of the
federal government's restrictions on reinstatement and accused the government
of restricting Indian status for financial reasons. NWAC was also critical of the
Bill because it would allow non-Indian women who acquired status through
marriage to Indian husbands to retain their status. This was regarded by NWAC
as the continuance of sexual discrimination. The AFN was also dissatisfied with
Bill C-47 because it did not allow for bands to determine their own membership.
Bill C-47 died in the Senate.
Even Bill C-3 1, which did amend the Indian Act, has been roundly criticized:
31. Supra, note 19 at 639.
32. Delia Opekokew, "Self-identification and Cultural Preservation: A Commentary on
Recent Indian Act Amendments" [1986] 2 C.N.L.R. 1 at 19.
33. Supra, note 16 at 161.
34. Supra, note 16 at 162.
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Bill C-31 was a political compromise, based only partially on the positions
of Indian people. Mostly, it reflected an attempt to appease competing polit-
ical pressures while keeping costs to a minimum. While trying to appeal to
the greatest number of people by being 'middle of the road' it succeeded,
rather, in pleasing no one.
35
Bill C-31 was introduced into the House of Commons on February 28, 1985 and
was given Royal Assent on June 28. It came into force, retroactively, on April
17, 1985 along with s. 15 of the Charter. Ironically, Bill C-31 ended up
recognizing fewer Aboriginal people as status Indians than the earlier proposal
to amend the Indian Act, Bill C-47.
Clearly, time was of the essence in passing Bill C-31 as the deadline for the
implementation of s. 15 of the Charter loomed. As it was, Bill C-31 was enacted
two months after s. 15 of the Charter took effect. Despite the fact that fewer
people would be recognized as having Indian status under Bill C-31 than under
the previous Bill C-47, Aboriginal groups protested Bill C-31 to a much lesser
degree than they had protested Bill C-47. This imminent deadline in the
discussion of Bill C-31 resulted in virtually all Aboriginal groups giving in to a
proposal that they were not satisfied with.
36
RESIDUAL SEX DISCRIMINATION UNDER BILL C-31
The amendments to the IndianAct reinstated Indian women who lost their status
by marrying out. However, bands had the option of continuing to exclude these
women if they developed their own membership rules (described in more detail
below) prior to June 28, 1987, under section 11 of the amended Indian Act.
37
While these women are recognized by Indian and Northern Affairs as status
Indians, they are not regarded as members of any band of Indians. 38
In order to be reinstated/registered as a status Indian under the amendments to
the Act, individuals desiring status must apply to the Registrar of Indian and
Northern Affairs. Based on a search of the individual's or the individual's family
records and the criteria set out in s. 6 of the Indian Act, the Registrar will decide
35. NWAC "Presentation to the Standing Committee on Aboriginal Affairs on Bill C-31"
(Thunder Bay: Ontario Native Women's Association, 1988) at p. 5.
36. Supra, note 16 at 172.
37. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Report to Parliament: Implementation of the
1985 Changes to the Indian Act, (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada,
1987).
38. Supra, note 16 at 172.
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whether to grant status. 39 The Registrar has some discretion in determining
whether or not he will grant status.
Notwithstanding the amendments to the Indian Act, there remains residual
sexual discrimination in the Act. Section 6 of the amended Indian Act served to
create what is commonly referred to as the second generation cut-off rule for
determining status. The new s. 6 of the Act creates two classes of Indians: those
recognized as Indians under s. 6(1) of the Act, who are able to pass on their
status to their children, regardless of whether the other parent is recognized as
an Indian under the Indian Act; and those recognized under s. 6(2) of the Act,
who are unable to pass on their status, unless the other parent is also recognized
as a status Indian. Thus, after two successive generations of non-Indian parents,
an individual will not be recognized as a status Indian.
Prior to the 1985 amendments to the Act, Indian men conferred s. 6(1) status on
their non-Indian wives. Thus, any child from such a marriage would be granted
status under s. 6(1) of the Act. However, women who "married out" and were
reinstated under Bill C-31 are not able to pass on their status in the same manner.
While these women were granted status under s. 6(1) of the Act, their children
are only eligible for status as s. 6(2) Indians. Even more absurd is the possibility
that non-Indian women, who "married in" prior to the enactment of Bill C-31
and subsequently divorced their Indian husbands, could remarry and pass on
their Indian status to children who have no Aboriginal ancestry at all.40 Status
Indians recognized under s. 6(2) of the Act are also not automatically entitled
to band membership, even where bands have chosen to grant membership to
women reinstated under Bill C-31.41
The inequality of treatment of women who married out prior to 1985 compared
to their Indian brothers has been a source of some protest throughout the
Aboriginal community. The arbitrary distinction between men who married out
after 1985 and those who married out prior to the amended act has also been
objected to by Aboriginal groups. The general disgust of the Aboriginal groups
was reflected in a pamphlet published by INAC itself on behalf of the AFN,
NWAC and the Native Council of Canada (NCC).42
39. Supra, note 37 at 6-7.
40. Native Women's Association of Canada, "Guide to Bill C-31: An Act to Amend the
Indian Act" (1986), NWAC at 10.
41. Supra, note 16 at 173.
42. Native Women's Association of Canada/Native Council of Canada/Assembly of First
Nations, "Correcting Historic Wrongs? Report of the National Aboriginal Inquiry of the
Impacts of Bill C-31" (1990) Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, at 16-
19. Although there was no consensus among the Aboriginal groups surveyed as to what
should be done to remedy this inequality of treatment, all groups involved expressed
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This inequality of treatment has been acknowledged, on several occasions, by
INAC before Parliament. 43 The Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs at the
time Bill C-31 was introduced, David Crombie, justified this discrimination to
the House of Commons by stating that the federal government had to "draw the
line" somewhere when determining who would and who would not be entitled
to the benefits accorded status Indians. 44 William McKnight, a subsequent
Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs, also acknowledged the residual dis-
crimination in the Indian Act, but justified it by noting the disagreement of
Aboriginal groups on the issue:
The discrimination I think you refer to is the difference between Indian
males and Indian females in maintaining Indian status. ... Bill C-31 spent a
very long time in committee. ...I think [the legislation that was passed] was
a compromise that all members from all parties recognized should be put
forward and supported because it did bring about a change and remove
some of the sexual discrimination that is there.
45
The inability of Aboriginal groups to agree on the issue of who should be granted
status does not relieve Canada of its obligations under the Charter. The Standing
Committee on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development also noted the residual
sexual discrimination in the Act and recommended to the House of Commons that:
...section 6(2) of An Act to Amend the Indian Act, 1985 be amended before
the end of the current session of Parliament in order to eliminate discrimi-
nation between brothers and sisters... 46
BAND MEMBERSHIP CODES
Not only did Bill C-31 attempt to address sexual discrimination in the Indian
Act, but it also sought to appease Indian bands pushing for self-government by
allowing bands to enact their own membership codes. Status Indian organiza-
tions, most notably the National Indian Brotherhood (NIB, now known as the
disdain for the classification scheme for Indians under ss. 6(1) and 6(2) and also agreed
that the discriminatory treatment must somehow be eliminated.
43. Supra, note 27 at 282.
44. House of Commons. Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence of the Standing Committee
on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Respecting Bill C-31, an Act to
amend the Indian Act, Issue #14 at 25. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services,
1985) at 173.
45. Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committe on Aboriginal Affairs and Northern De-
velopment, Fifth Report of the Standing Committee of Aboriginal Affairs and Northern De-
velopment on consideration of the implementation of An Act to Amend the Indian Act as
Passed by the House of Commons on June 12, 1985, No. 46 (June 28, 1988) at 35.
46. Ibid. at 36.
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Assembly of First Nations), wished to use the problematic s. 12(l)(b) as a lever
to increase opportunities for native self-government. 47
Section 10 of the amended IndianAct outlines the procedure a band must follow
in order to gain control over its membership. In order to enact its own member-
ship code, a band must first give notice to its members of its intent to assume
control of its own membership. The band must then consent, through a majority
of electors, to assuming the responsibility of maintaining its own membership
and must also agree to the particular rules that will used by the band to determine
membership. Finally, the band must give notice to the Minister of Indian and
Northern Indian Affairs that the band intends to take control of its own mem-
bership. 48 Whether or not a band is able to actually implement its own member-
ship rules is ultimately at the discretion of the Minister of Indian and Northern
Affairs.
INAC has indicated that before it will grant a band the ability to establish its
own membership rules the proposed rules must provide the ability for an
applicant to appeal the decision and comply with the Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.4 9 INAC has also stated that it will consider the following factors in
determining whether it will grant a band the ability to determine its own
membership: precision in definitions used in the proposed membership rules;
confidentiality in the application process; etc.50 Bands which did not have their
own membership rules in place by June 28, 1987 were required to accept status
Indians reinstated by Indian and Northern Affairs under Bill C-31 as band
members. Indian bands which did enact their own membership rules prior to
this deadline and chose to exclude reinstated women from their band lists created
a group of Indians recognized as such by INAC. These Indians are unable to
return to their communities because they are not band members.
The new legislation creates a dissociation between band membership and
recognition as a status Indian. It could be argued that this option of Indian bands
to refuse membership to women reinstated as Indians under Bill C-31 is also
sexual discrimination. 51 The new rules for band membership have created
47. Supra, note 16 at 82-83.
48. Section 10(1) of the Indian Act. See also: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Indian
Band Membership: An Information Booklet Concerning New Indian Band Membership
Laws and the Preparation of Indian Band Membership Codes (Ottawa: Minister of
Supply and Services, 1985) at 10.
49. Ibid. at 23-24.
50. Ibid. at 24-25.
51. As Joyce Green does in, "Constitutionalising the Patriarchy: Aboriginal Women and
Aboriginal Government" (1993) 5 Constitutional Forum 110 at 113.
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further confusion in Aboriginal communities. 52 The difference between a status
Indian and a band member can be quite confusing. There is also a disincentive
for bands to have membership rules that differ substantially from the criteria
used by Indian and Northern Affairs to determine who is a status Indian. Funding
from the federal government for community services (health care, housing, etc.)
is based only on the number of status Indians in the community, not the number
of members recognized by the band council.53 While the majority of Indian
bands have looked at the possibility of implementing their own membership
rules,54 it is puzzling that INAC thinks of this as a form of self-government when
bands face very real financial constraints in determining their membership if
they do not toe INAC's line. As Moss notes, those reserve communities which
are highly dependent on federal support may reach a "crisis point" if INAC
continues a policy of providing funding only for the status Indian population. 55
Several bands have recently litigated INAC's limits on membership rules. Led
by Senator Walter Twinn, Chief of the Sawridge band, several Indian bands from
northern Alberta challenged the constitutionality of the procedures for determin-
ing membership and status in an Indian band. 56
The Indian bands argued that the procedures violate the Aboriginal right to
determine their own membership under s. 35 of the Constitution and that it is
only Indian bands, not the federal government, that can determine who is eligible
to be on a membership list.57 The Sawridge band was the first band to have its
own membership rules in effect 58 and it chose to exclude women reinstated
under Bill C-31 from band membership. 59
52. Supra, note 27 at 290-91.
53. Supra, note 27 at 292.
54. Supra, note 37 at 12-13.
55. Supra, note 27 at 296.
56. Sawridge Band v. Canada [1995] F.C.J. No. 1013, (July 6, 1995) (F.C.T.D.).
57. Ibid. at 113.
58. Supra, note 37 at D-1. The Sawridge band's membership rules came into affect on July
8, 1985.
59. In a speech given at the 18th N.W.A.C. General Assembly, October 17, 1992, Mary
Two Axe Earley indicates her belief that bands generally choose not to allow reinstated
women to return to their communities if they had opposed the band council, particularly
over the issue of sexual equality in determining Indian status. Another possible expla-
nation for the Sawridge Band's refusal to allow reinstated women to become band
members may have been concern over the distribution of oil revenues to additional
band members.
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Muldoon J. (in a rather confusing decision) upheld the Bill C-31 amendments
to the Indian Act. Muldoon J.'s rationale appears to be twofold. First, s. 35(4)
of the Charter grants Aboriginal rights equally to male and female persons.
Second, there is no "existing" inherent Aboriginal right or treaty right to
determine band membership. Walter Twinn has indicated his intent to appeal the
decision.
THE CONFLICT BETWEEN COLLECTIVE AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
The past and current debate over who should be recognized as an Indian presents
a number of problems. Rights in Aboriginal communities are traditionally
regarded as collective in nature. During the constitutional negotiation process,
many Aboriginal groups argued that the Charter of Rights should not apply to
First Nations because the individualistic nature of the rights enshrined in the
Charter would undermine the more collective nature of Aboriginal rights. The
problem of residual sexual discrimination in the rules determining Indian status
is very much tied into this issue. 60
Mary Ellen Turpel, the AFN's advisor on constitutional issues, is critical of the
Charter view of rights because it is rooted in the assumption that society is an
aggregate of individual interests.6 1 Turpel characterizes Aboriginal rights
claims as requests for the recognition of another culture and goes on to argue
that the Supreme Court of Canada lacks the cultural authority to decide these
legal issues. Even if the Supreme Court did have the cultural authority to make
these decisions, argues Turpel, it would get them wrong because they will decide
in accordance with their own cultural background, rather than an Aboriginal
cultural background. One of Turpel's primary concerns is that imposing the
Charter on First Nations would encourage members of First Nations to go
outside of their communities to settle disputes. This, says Turpel, would weaken
Aboriginal systems of dispute resolution.
It is important to note that Turpel makes an implicit distinction between using
the Charter to attack Aboriginal laws and using the Charter to attack federal
or provincial laws which apply to Aboriginal people. 62 Turpel's plea is for the
60. Supra, note 16, for a thorough discussion of Aboriginal women and the constitutional
talks from 1982 to 1987. Krosenbrink-Gelissen addresses sexual equality for Aboriginal
women vis a vis Aboriginal men, the sexually discriminatory provisions of the Indian
Act and the Bill C-31 amendments, and the role of native women in forms of Aboriginal
self-government.
61. Mary Ellen Turpel, "Aboriginal Peoples and the Canadian Charter; Interpretive
Monoplies, Cultural Differences" (1989-90), 6 Can. Human Rights Yrbk. 3.
62. Ibid. at 4.
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protection of Aboriginal concepts of rights and dispute resolution, not the
protection of Canadian laws (such as the Indian Act) which happen to govern
Aboriginal people. Nonetheless, Turpel still makes note of the problem of
residual sexual discrimination under the Indian Act and argues that disputes
arising out of this form of discrimination should be resolved through "customary
practices" of Aboriginal dispute resolution. 63 What Turpel overlooks is the fact
that the determination of who does or does not have status is made through the
Indian Act, a piece of federal legislation.
Even those bands which have implemented their own membership rules are not
necessarily applying "Aboriginal law". As I have noted earlier, in order to
implement its own membership rules, a band must first receive approval from
Indian and Northern Affairs and the rules submitted to INAC must also comply
with the Charter. It seems rather difficult to accept the proposition that band
membership codes are "Aboriginal law" if the authority to enact these codes
was delegated to them from a government which, according to Turpel, lacks the
"cultural authority" to adequately protect Aboriginal rights. It is also difficult
to accept Turpel's argument in light of the fact that one of INAC's stated
conditions for allowing band control over membership is that a band's rules for
membership must comply with the Charter.
Furthermore, the band councils which currently govern most First Nations are
the creation of the Indian Act and are often regarded as an imposed form
government. 64 If these band councils were created and granted their authority
by Canadian Parliament, it only seems natural that the Charter should apply to
these band councils. The argument that the Charter will erode traditional
Aboriginal conceptions of rights weakens when one considers the fact that the
form of government they will apply to is almost never a traditional form of
Aboriginal government, but rather the elected band council imposed by the
Indian Act. Many bands have defended s. 12(l)(b) of the Indian Act as tradition
(see note 19, above) and are strongly opposed to reinstatement (the Twinn case
is a good example of this type of situation). 65
NWAC has been very insistent that the Charter of Rights and Freedoms be
applied to First Nations, until First Nations develop their own Aboriginal
Charter of Rights. While NWAC acknowledges that applying the Charter to First
63. Ibid. at 6.
64. For a more detailed description and discussion of the band council government under
the Indian Act see Leroy Little Bear, "Indian Government Pursuant to the .Indian Act"
in Pathways to Self-Determination: Canadian Indians and the Canadian State (Little
Bear, Boldt & Long, eds., 1984).
65. Supra, note 19 at 113.
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Nations might pose a threat to Aboriginal culture, the organization argues that
unless individual rights are protected within Aboriginal communities, there will
be no more Aboriginal people. One of NWAC's reasons for arguing that the
Charter should be applied to First Nations is that patriarchal laws imposed on
Aboriginal communities have diminished Aboriginal women's traditional social
position and Aboriginal women must struggle to again attain the position they
traditionally occupied. 66 Others argue that any collective Aboriginal right to
self-determination is based on the individual's ability to express rights to
self-determination and that collective rights can only exist where individual
rights are protected.
Moss characterizes the position of Aboriginal groups opposed to having the
Charter applied to First Nations more benignly than NWAC has. Moss states
that Aboriginal groups don't want laws imposed on them if they have not had
an opportunity to participate in the development of these laws. 67 But Moss also
acknowledges the difficulty of arguing that any collective Aboriginal right is
being violated by applying s. 15 of the Charter to the Indian Act's rules for
determining status. This difficulty arises largely because the rules for determin-
ing Indian status do not allow "Indigenous governments" to determine entitle-
ment to Indian status. Unless one takes the Twinn point of view that the right to
decide who has status as an Indian is an Aboriginal right protected under s. 35
of the Constitution, it seems fairly clear that the Charter should apply to the
provisions of the Indian Act which determine status.
This very healthy debate within the Aboriginal community over the nature
(collective or individual) of Aboriginal rights should not be used as an excuse
to sacrifice Aboriginal women's rights under the Indian Act. The claim that it is
more important to protect some vaguely defined "collective" Aboriginal right
to determine membership ignores the fact that any currently existing "Aborigi-
nal right" to decide membership is granted to band councils at the discretion of
the Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs, according to criteria established by
INAC. It seems rather inconsistent for groups such as the Assembly of First
Nations to, on the one hand, decry the application of the Indian Act as a form of
"cultural destruction 68 for its history of colonialism and paternalism and yet,
on the other hand, embrace the limited control over band membership provided
by the amended Indian Act as a form of Aboriginal self-government. Arguments
like this also obscure the fact that many truly traditional forms of determining
66. Supra, note 20 at 11.
67. Supra, note 27 at 300.
68. Supra, note 61 at 7.
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Aboriginal identity (frequently matriarchal in nature) 70 are conveniently over-
looked by band councils who have implemented their own rules for determining
membership.
LIMITATIONS OF A CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY
One of the greatest limitations of any court imposed remedy to the residual sex
discrimination in the Indian Act is the further strain on already limited band
resources. This was one of the primary objections of many native groups to Bill
C-31.71 Despite Indian and Northern Affair's promises of additional resources
to aid bands in their compliance with Bill C-31, many Indian bands have
protested the financial strain that having to provide services for additional
members has created.72 INAC has estimated that the costs it incurred through
expenditures for Bill C-31 Indians from the introduction of the amendments
through June 1990 was $338 million.73 INAC budgeted $206 million for
expenditures on Bill C-31 Indians for the 1992-93 year.
The other limitation of a court imposed remedy to residual sex discrimination
in the Indian Act is that this will be an externally imposed solution. Individual
bands and groups representing Aboriginal people will feel as if they have had a
limited ability to influence the remedy. While Aboriginal groups will have the
ability to intervene in any litigation over this issue, their ability to help fashion
the remedy will be circumscribed particularly if the court chooses to grant a
remedy such as severance or extension. From the perspective of intervenants in
any such litigation, a suspended declaration of invalidity would be the remedy
of choice because it would allow for their influence over any further amend-
ments made to the Indian Act.
Whatever remedy the court may grant will not resolve this ongoing dispute
among Aboriginal groups over the individual rights enshrined in the Charter and
whether the Charter should apply to First Nations, in light of the collective
nature of rights in Aboriginal communities. However, this is clearly an issue
70. The test in Calder v. Attorney General of British Columbia (1973), 34 D.L.R. (3d) 145
(S.C.C.) suggests that these traditional practices for determining band membership may
be an Aboriginal right protected under s. 35, if these practices existed prior to contact.
This might protect, for example, the traditional Iroquoian method of determining
Aboriginality through one's mother. However, this doesn't mean that INAC would nec-
essarily have to recognize such a method of determining band membership for its pur-
poses, as the recent Twinn decision suggests.
71. Supra, note 27 at 282.
72. Supra, note 27 at 288.
73. Indian and Northern Affairs Canada, Growth in Federal Expenditures on Aboriginal
Peoples. (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services, 1993) at 40.
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that is outside of the role of the courts and, important though it is, should not be
given too much consideration by the court. What is within the court's power is
to provide a remedy for the violation of the Charter by s. 6 of the Indian Act.
POTENTIAL REMEDIES
Although I am engaging in an analysis of hypothetical actions at this point in
time, litigation on this issue is ongoing. Should the court find a violation of s.
15 of the Charter which cannot be justified under s. 1, they will have to consider
the remedy they will grant. My primary focus will be on the remedies of reading
in or extension of the legislation and the delayed declaration of invalidity.
Severance, or reading down, is the removal of those parts of the legislation
which infringe the Charter. The problem with severance in this situation is that
it is not clear on the face of s. 6 of the Act what portion of the statute could be
severed in order to make it comply with s. 15 of the Charter. What Bill C-31 did
was reinstate women who married out and also imposed a new second generation
cut-off rule on all those who married out after Bill C-31 was enacted. The fact
that men who married out prior to Bill C-31 can pass on their status to two
successive generations is hidden in the legislation. There is no phrase in the
statute which can be severed to make s. 6 of the Indian Act comply with the
Charter because the problem lies in previous versions of the statute, as well as
the amended Act.
The remedy granted in Andrews v. Law Society of British Columbia74 suggests
that it may not be necessary to focus so strictly on the written formulation of a
statute when using the remedy of severance. In Andrews, the Supreme Court
took a more substantive approach to the remedy for a breach of equality rights.
Deleting the words "a Canadian citizen" from s. 42(a) of the Barristers and
Solicitors Act would have left a statute that did not make any sense. Instead, the
court simply voided the substantive citizenship requirement in the statute.
In light of the Andrews case, it is possible that a court faced with finding a
remedy for residual sexual discrimination of the Indian Act may be content to
sever the substantive requirement that the children of women who married out
prior to 1985 be given status as s. 6(2) Indians. However, severance is a remedy
of judicial restraint and deference to the legislature. A court may be reluctant to
sever this requirement of the legislation, given that the Senate did not pass Bill
C-47. Bill C-47, the precursor to Bill C-31, would have allowed Indian status
to be passed on through two successive generations.
74. (1989) 56 D.L.R. 1.
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Absent the application of severance, the remaining remedies left to be applied
in this situation are an extension of the benefit or a declaration of invalidity.
READING IN/EXTENSION OF S. 6
From the perspective of the litigant, extension of s. 6 would be preferable to the
suspended declaration of invalidity. There is a degree of certainty in the remedy
of reading in that does not exist in the declaration of invalidity. In the case of
residual sex discrimination in the Indian Act, a litigant would want to extend the
benefit of s. 6(1) of the Act to the children of women who married out prior to
1985 and which would also result in the extension of the benefit of s. 6(2) to the
grandchildren of these women.
In order to assess the likelihood that the courts would extend the application of
s. 6 of the Indian Act to include the grandchildren of women who married out
prior to 1985, it is first necessary to perform the three-step analysis that the
Supreme Court applied in Schachter v. Canada.
75
THE THREE-STEP SCHACHTER ANALYSIS
The first step, in the Schachter analysis, is to define the extent of the statutory
inconsistency with the Charter. In the case of the residual sex discrimination in
the Indian Act, the inconsistency is the application of the new second generation
cut off rule to women who married non-Indian men prior to 1985. These women
are not able to pass on their status in the same manner as Indian men who married
out prior to the Bill C-31 amendments. The result is that the grandchildren of
these women will not be recognized as a status Indian unless there is another
parent or grandparent who is recognized as a status Indian.
The second step in the Schachter analysis is to determine if the inconsistency
of the Indian Act with the Charter is of a nature that allows for remedial options
and assess the impact of available remedies on the objective of the legislation
in question. At this stage, the court must determine whether severance or
extension would be more appropriate than striking down the impugned legisla-
tion.76 The first consideration is whether a remedy of extension can be defined
with sufficient precision. The court indicates that there will be cases where:
...the questions of how the statute ought to be extended in order to comply
with the Constitution cannot be answered with a sufficient degree of preci-
sion on the basis of a constitutional analysis... 77
75. (1993) 93 D.L.R. (4th) 1 (S.C.C.).
76. Ibid. at 18.
77. Ibid.
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In these types of situations, Lamer C.J. suggests that the court would be taking
on the legislature's role if it were to apply the remedy of extension. In the case
of the residual sex discrimination in the Indian Act, the group of people to whom
the remedy would be extended is fairly explicit-the grandchildren of women
who married out prior to 1985.
According to the Schachter analysis, the next consideration in determining
whether severance or reading in is the appropriate remedy is whether or not
extension will interfere with the legislative objective behind the statute. Accord-
ing to Lamer C.J., this can be determined only through "careful attention to the
objective embodied in the legislation in question."
'7 8
One of the primary objectives of the Indian Act amendments of 1985 was to
eliminate gender discrimination in the Act. The combination of the U.N. Human
Rights Committee's decision in the Lovelace case and the advent of the Charter,
made eliminating gender discrimination from the determination of Indian status
very important to Parliament. 79 The literature published by INAC on Bill C-31
was full of self-congratulation for the elimination of sexual discrimination from
the IndianAct (despite the fact that INAC was well aware that there was residual
discrimination in the Act). 80 If the methods of determining status under the
amended Act don't meet this stated objective of sexual equality, this seems to
strengthen the case for reading in or extending s. 6.
The secondary objective of Bill C-31 was to satisfy the goal of self-government
that some Aboriginal groups pushed while discussions of the scope and nature
of the amendments to the Act were ongoing.
It is here in this second step of the Schachter analysis that considerations of
costs also come into play. It is costs that will be a major hurdle in any argument
for reading in as a remedy over a declaration of invalidity. Schachter indicated
a very clear reluctance on the part of the courts to use reading in as a remedy
and the potential costs of extending paternity benefits was very much a factor
in the decision. 8 1
78. Ibid. at 20.
79. Supra, note51 at 114.
80. Supra, note 4 at 1.
81. Ryan Rempel argues that budgetary concerns were the primary concern of the Supreme
Court in the Schachter decision. See Ryan Rempel, "The Possibilities of Schachter. A
Response to Professor Duclos" (1993) 5 Constitutional Forum 106. At 106, Rempel
writes 'The real question, argues Lamer C.J., is whether the inevitable budgetary im-
plications of any remedial choice are sufficiently serious to raise doubts as to whether
the Court would in fact be preserving legislative intent through the technique it pro-
poses to apply."
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In the case of the residual sex discrimination, as in Schachter, the court will
have no idea how many people would be affected by such a remedy. However,
one important difference from the Schachter situation is that here the group to
which the benefit would be extended would be smaller than the group currently
receiving the benefits conferred on those recognized as status Indians under the
Indian Act. Lamer C.J. has indicated that this is a distinction of no small
importance:
Where the group to be added is smaller than the group originally benefited,
this is an indication that the assumption that the legislature would have en-
acted the benefit in any case is a sound one.
82
This may be a factor that weighs in favour of reading in as a remedy.
However, Lamer C.J. goes on to add that it is not the numbers alone which
determine whether the legislature would still have enacted the benefit.
Instead, "the numbers may indicate that for budgetary reasons... it cannot be
assumed that the legislature would have passed the benefit without the
exclusion. '83 It is important to note that, while the number of people the
benefit would be extended to would be smaller than the number currently
receiving the benefit, the benefits granted to status Indians would involve much
larger expenditures per individual than the paternity benefits sought by the
respondent in Schachter.
In his decision in the Schachter case, Lamer C.J. states that "in a benefits case,
it may not be a safe assumption that the legislature would have enacted a benefits
scheme if it were impermissible to exclude particular parties from entitle-
ment under that scheme."'84 While it should be permissible for Parliament to
exclude parties from entitlements under a statutory scheme, it is appalling to
think that such exclusion on the very arbitary basis of sex would be allowed
to continue. Furthermore, in the situation of the residual sex discrimination
of the Indian Act, there is a strong argument that Parliament, while clearly
wishing to exclude some parties from the benefits conferred to Indians, may
well have extended these benefits to the grandchildren of women reinstated.
Bill C-47 would have implemented a quarter-blood rule to determine Indians
status and would have granted Indian status to a much larger number of
people than Bill C-31, even with the court extending benefits to comply with
the Charter.
82. Supra, note 74 at 23.
83. Ibid.
84. Ibid.
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Furthermore, while Bill C-31 has increased the number of status Indians in the
short term, one cannot ignore the fact that, in the long term, the number of status
Indians will decrease as a result of the amendments to the Indian Act.85 Prior to
the enactment of Bill C-3 1, men could pass on their Indian status indefinitely to
their male descendants. Under the amended Act, no one can pass on their status
indefinitely to their descendants. The Act only allows the "passing on" of status if
one is an Indian under s.6(1) of the Act or, where an Indian is recognized under s.
6(2) of the Act, if the other parent is an Indian as well. Many Aboriginal people are
concerned about a rapid decline in the status Indian population, particularly in light
of the current rates of intermarriage between status Indians and non-Indians. 86
Given the prominence that Lamer C.J. gave budgetary considerations in his
Schachter decision, it is worth pointing out that the extension of parental leave
benefits to biological fathers was estimated to have a cost of $502 million in
1986.87 INAC budgeted $206 million for the costs of administering services to
Bill C-31 Indians. 88 The population not recognized as having Indian status due
to the residual sexual discrimination in the Indian Act, while uncertain, would
nonetheless be considerably smaller than the Bill C-31 population and the cost
associated with extending s. 6(2) of the Act to this group would still be much
smaller than the projected costs of extension in Schachter. Lamer C.J. does not
give any threshold of costs in Schachter to indicate when these budgetary
concerns will give rise to a judicial preference for the declaration of invalidity.
However, it still bodes well for potential litigants that the costs associated with
an extension remedy will be considerably cheaper than in the Schachter case.
The third step in the Schachter analysis is to examine changes that are a result
of any extension or reading down to see if this significantly alters the portion of
the statute that remains. If what remains is so significantly altered by the remedy
that "the assumption that the legislature would have passed it was unsafe," 89
then the use of extension or severance as a remedy would be inappropriate.
It is important to note that some of Lamer C.J.'s reluctance to apply the remedy
of extension in Schachter was because there were a number of ways in which
the law could be made constitutional. In the case of the Indian Act's residual
85. Supra, note 27 at 291.
86. Supra, note 45 at 29.
87. Schachter (1988), 52 D.L.R. (4th) 525 at 551 as cited in Nitya Duclos and Kent Roach,
"Constitutional Remedies as 'Constitutional Hints': A Comment on R. v. Schachter" 36
McGill L.J. 1 at 20.
88. Supra, note 72.
89. Supra, note 74 at 21.
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discrimination, the court has less discretion in making s. 6 of the Act constitu-
tional. It may choose to extend status to the grandchildren of women who
married out prior to 1985-this is all that is needed to make s. 6 comply with s.
15 of the Charter.
The emphasis on legislative intent that must be used under the Schachter
approach to extension as a remedy forces the court to engage in a process of
speculation. The court may not see this as an appropriate role for itself and may
refuse to grant an extension for this reason. While there are many factors which
seem to weigh in favour of an extension remedy, the decision regarding the
remedy will ultimately depend on how the court will characterize Parliament's
reluctance to revisit the issue of sexual inequality in the Indian Act and the
acknowledgement of residual sexual discrimination.
Duclos takes a very cynical view of Schachter and argues that the decision
maintains a bias for declarations of invalidity over extension as a remedy.90
However, others argue that a different set of facts would have made the court
willing to apply extension as a remedy. Rempel suggests the fact that only the
remedy was appealed in Schachter frustrated the court because it was unable to
analyze whether or not there really was a violation of equality rights. He argues
that Lamer C.J. was unconvinced that there was a s. 15 violation that was
unjustified by s. 1 and this is what underlies his decision not to grant an extension
of the benefits.
Haig v. Canada9 1 takes a broad view of the rules set out by Lamer C.J. in
Schachter. The decision in Haig appears quite progressive in its extension of
the protection of the Canadian Human Rights Act to gays and lesbians. What
also makes the Haig case remarkable is how the Ontario Court of Appeal applies
the test of deference to the legislature, so strongly emphasized in the Schachter
decision. Krever J.A.'s approach emphasizes the importance of human rights
legislation and gives this more weight than the legislature's reluctance to extend
other benefits to gays and lesbians. Should any court hearing a suit brought
against the residual gender discrimination in the Act find the facts of the case
give rise to a more persuasive claim than Schachter, the court may be willing
to apply a more generous test, as the court in Haig did.
90. Nitya Duclos, "A Remedy for the Nineties: Schachter v. R. and Haig and Birch v. Can-
ada" (1992) 4 Constitutional Forum 22.
91. (1992),90.R. (3d) 495 (C.A.)
Residual Sex Discrimination in the Indian Act
DECLARATION OF INVALIDITY
Clearly, should a court decide to apply a declaration of invalidity to the situation
at hand, it would have to be a delayed declaration of the invalidity of section 6
of the Indian Act. Canadian legislatures have a history of complying with such
orders and would have another incentive to comply with such a declaration by the
courts: it would be unclear who was entitled to live on a reserve in many First
Nations communities if Parliament were not to comply with the declaration.
The problem is that if a delayed declaration of invalidity were to be granted,
Parliament would have to decide the issue of Indian status all over again. Given
the problems Parliament encountered the first time it attempted to eliminate
sexual discrimination in the IndianAct, it is unclear how they would resolve this
issue. In issuing a delayed declaration of invalidity, the court would present
Parliament and Aboriginal groups with many of the same problems they faced
when they sat down to remedy this problem ten years ago. A suspended
declaration of invalidity would impose another deadline, similar to the deadline
imposed on Bills C-47 and C-31 by the coming into force of s. 15 of the Charter.
Such a deadline may result in legislation that is just as flawed as the legislation
that was rushed into the first time around.
Some Aboriginal groups may once again use the problem of sex discrimination
in the Indian Act as an opportunity to negotiate additional "self-government"
through further amendments to the Act. This would truly be a travesty. Self-gov-
ernment issues should not be tied into issues of equality rights at the negotiating
table. By tying them into one another when discussions for Bills C-47 and C-31
took place, Aboriginal people ended up with less than true sexual equality under
the Indian Act and provisions which allowed limited band control over its member-
ship. Furthermore, there seems to be a certain degree of inconsistency in making
arguments for Aboriginal self-government and then negotiating a form of
"self-government" which is granted under the authority of the Indian Act.
It is quite possible that if Parliament were to reopen the issue of entitlement to
status, it may well decide to delegate control over Indian status entitlement to
First Nations governments. 92 Rather than eliminating residual sexual discrimi-
nation, such a delegation may only exacerbate the problem. In Alberta, where
there was widespread opposition to the Bill C-31 amendments designed to make
the Act comply with the Charter, it has been estimated that fewer than two per
cent of the 9541 persons who have been accepted as status Indians have been
accepted as band members. 9 3 Having Parliament "hand off" the problem to First
92. Supra, note 27 at 298.
93. Supra, note 56 at 113.
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Nations would not be a desirable method of resolving the problem of residual
sex discrimination. Bands may not wish to eliminate the discrimination which
remains in determining Indian status and could conceivably argue that this is an
Aboriginal right under s. 35 of the Charter. Many people facing such sexual
discrimination from their bands, rather than from INAC, may be less willing to
take their band to court to remedy the problem.
94
Reading down, as Sopinka J. states in Osborne v. Canada,95 reflects a policy of
judicial restraint rooted in a presumption of constitutionality and also of defer-
ence to the legislature. Similar principles of judicial restraint are to apply where
reading in is the remedy granted. However, it is unclear whether this "rule of
construction" applies in Charter cases. 96 The situation at hand also begs the
question: can this deference be given to Parliament when it has been expressly
acknowledged that sexual discrimination remains in the Indian Act and yet has
done nothing to remedy this situation?
The Schachter case suggests that a suspended declaration of invalidity may be
the remedy the courts are more willing to apply in this situation. While extension
as a remedy is possible, it requires speculation as to the legislative intent of
Parliament that the court may not be willing to engage in. In Corbiere v. Canada
(Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs)97 case, a delayed declararion of
invalidity was granted by the Federal Court. In Corbiere, several status Indians
(also members of the Batchewana Indian band), living off the reserve, chal-
lenged s. 77(1) of the Indian Act. This provision of the Act allowed only band
members living on the reserve to vote in band council elections and to vote in
decisions to cede band land. The appellants successfully argued that this violated
s. 15 of the Charter and the Federal Court granted a delayed declaration of
invalidity as the remedy.
In his decision, Strayer J. placed great emphasis on the fact that the vast majority
of those Indians living off the reserve were Indians reinstated as band members
under Bill C-31.98 Strayer J. indicates that the inability of band members living
94. Supra, note 56 at 113. NWAC has urged Indian women and their descendants who are
victims of the residual sexual discrimination in the Indian Act not to bring suit against
their bands.
95. [1991] 2 S.C.R. 69.
96. Metropolitan Stores (MTS) Ltd. v. Manitoba Food and Commercial Workers (1987), 38
D.L.R. 321 at 331.
97. (1993), 107 D.L.R. (4th) 582 (F.C.T.D.).
98. Ibid. at 594.
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off the reserve to vote in band council elections is not a violation of s. 15 of the
Charter.
However, he finds other provisions of s. 77(1) to violate s. 15, particularly those
which exclude members living off-reserve from voting on any potential surren-
der of reserve land and in respect of the use of Indian moneys. Strayer J. finds
that it is impossible to either sever those provisions of s. 77(1) which are
unconstitutional or to read in a "saving interpretation" of s. 77(1).99 Strayer J.
states that "there is no simple deletion or addition which will readily correct this
situation and Parliament must have the opportunity to consider its options to
make the Act conform to the constitution." 100
Strayer J. refused to read in a remedy in Corbiere because it would be "com-
pletely speculative as to Parliament's intentions." Given the rest of the Corbiere
decision, it is difficult to imagine what else Parliament could have done but
included off-reserve Indians in votes which concern common assets of Indians
bands. Clearly, Corbiere reflects judicial reluctance to use the remedy of reading
in. Nonetheless, there is an important distinction between the Corbiere case and
the problem of residual sex discrimination in the Indian Act, which makes a
stronger argument for reading in as remedy to the latter situation.
In the case of residual sex discrimination in the Act, Parliament has already had
ample opportunity to consider options in order to make the provisions of the Act
which grant Indian status conform with s. 15 of the Charter. While there may
be no single phrase which can be deleted or added to s. 6 of the Indian Act to
remedy the remaining gender discrimination, extending s. 6(1) of the Act to
include the children of Indian women who married out prior to 1985 (and thus
extending s. 6(2) to the grandchildren of these women) is a simple addition
which will correct the problem of sexual discrimination satisfactorily.
CONCLUSION
The issue of residual gender discrimination in s. 6 of the Indian Act is one that
is very politically charged. At its root, the residual sexual discrimination in
determining Indian status is a problem of sexual inequality created by a federal
statute. This is not a problem presented by an inherent Aboriginal right or by
some form of Aboriginal self-government. Should those individuals who have
been the victims of sex discrimination under the Indian Act be required to wait
through another round of negotiations and Parliamentary debates to have their
rights vindicated? This would be the result of a delayed declaration of invalidity
99. Ibid. at 597.
100. Ibid.
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and it would truly be a hollow victory. Parliament has inexplicably refused to
address this issue for years, passing the blame onto Aboriginal groups for their
inability to agree on a solution for Parliament. To grant a declaration of invalidity
can be regarded as punishing the victim of discrimination for a problem that
Parliament has long been aware of. Given the legislative history of Bill C-31,
the remedy most appropriate is the extension of s. 6(1) of the Act to apply to the
children of Indian women who married out prior to 1985.
